Machines as Organisms: From Proxy Objects to Epistemic Tools (and Backward)

Abstract

In this paper, I address the following questions: How are mechanical artifacts and organic entities related historically and epistemically? And what is the philosophical meaning of this relationship? I begin by suggesting that, before exploring the nature of this relationship, it is worth exploring the meaning of the notion of “machine”. I will argue that, historically, we can trace two overarching conceptions: one anthropocentric and another non-anthropocentric. I show that the anthropocentric conception is the oldest and underpins the latter. As a paradigmatic example of anthropocentric conception, I explore Karl Marx’s idea of ​​a machine that Marx recovered from the mechanical engineer Charles Babbage. In the third section of this work, I linger on three philosophical insights that can be derived from Babbage and Marx’s reflections on machines, which I deem still instructive. In conclusion, I argue that a study addressing the historical and epistemic relationships between machines, organic bodies and labor is fundamentally relevant to clarify those discussions seeking identities and contrasts between organisms and generic machines.